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Small firms developing biotechnology applications often focus on establishing intellectual 
property rights, which can then be sold to more established firms with existing market chains. 
This paper explores the expected ‘Buyout’ price and economic surplus changes for an emerging 
bio-pharming application with transgenic tobacco. The results suggest a ‘Buyout’ price of about 
$1.75 billion. Yet despite this potentially large payout to the innovating firm, consumers also see 
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  1Market Strategies for a Tobacco Bio-Pharming Application: The Case of Gaucher’s 
Disease Treatment 
 
Genetic engineering of plants and animals holds the promise to produce therapeutic proteins at 
significant lower costs than current pharmaceutical drugs production methods
1. For example, 
empirical studies of bio-pharming show 10-100 times lower production costs compared to cell 
culture systems (Misson and Curling, 2000: Kusnadi, Nikolov and Howard, 1997)
2. Further, 
transgenic plants are generally preferred to transgenic animals for bio-pharming
3. Plants are 
better able to express complex proteins, and they do not serve as hosts for mammalian 
pathogens, which reduces the risk of contamination (Cramer et al., 1996). Research on plant-
produced proteins is conducted on a variety of agricultural crops such as corn, tobacco, potato, 
alfalfa, rice, and canola. Tobacco appears to be among the most preferred because of safety 
issues, and prior knowledge of the plant’s genome. Compared to other agricultural crops, tobacco 
is not used as feed or food supply. Tobacco also has an advantage from the standpoint of 
containment, as transgenic tobacco is either harvested before reaching maturity or tops are cut so 
that the tobacco does not flower
4. Thus, gene flow can be minimized.  
Research on tobacco has already achieved remarkable results and therapeutic proteins 
from transgenic tobacco are expected to be among the first marketed plant-produced medicines. 
Many biotech firms have utilized this novelty and are far beyond the laboratory experimental 
stage, conducting successful clinical trials towards commercialization. Successful human trials 
                                                 
1 The term drug here indicates the final product sold in the market, whereas protein refers to the material from which 
the drug is made. 
2 Cell culture systems refer to bacterial or mammalian cells genetically modified to express a desired protein. 
Examples are Chinese Hamster Ovary and Escherica Coli. The term drug here indicates the final product sold in the 
market, whereas protein refers to the material from which the drug is made. 
3 Transgenic plants refer to genetically modified plants. 
4 Tobacco has the disadvantage that its biomass must be processed immediately after harvest. 
 
  2have been conducted on several proteins of plant origin indicating that commercialization time is 
not far. CaroRX, for example, is a treatment for dental caries which has already received 
approval for production in Europe and it is now on stage II of clinical trials in the US. The 
company that invented the treatment plans to launch it on the market by 2005.   
These innovations will be covered by Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) laws, allowing 
patent holders exert market power to recover their Research and Development (R & D) costs and 
extract profits. Some small biotech firms adopt bio-pharming applications to produce drugs with 
lower cost for markets that are currently served by just a few (or only one) firms. These markets 
are characterized by high market power and a lower cost drug offers better profit opportunities 
compared to markets with more competitive firms. Often the strategy of small biotech firms is to 
establish IPRs, and then, be bought out by a larger competitor. For example, in the year 2004, 
Pfizer, a large pharmaceutical company paid $1.3 billion in cash for Esperion Therapeutics, a 
small firm with a drug that boosts levels of “good” cholesterol (Alpert, 2004). In the year 2001, 
Amgen Inc., a big biotech company agreed to buy Immunex Corp. with its very successful drug 
Enbrel for about $16 billion, achieving thus fur the largest biotech buyout (Gillis, 2002). A total 
of 2.7 billion was paid by pharmaceutical companies for seven biotech acquisitions in the year 
2000 and in the year 2003, companies paid over 5 billion for six firms (Alpert, 2004).  
The purpose of this paper is to determine an expected ‘Buyout’ price and potential 
economic surplus benefits that bio-pharming may introduce through a lower cost method for 
therapeutic proteins production with transgenic tobacco. Specifically, the study estimates the 
‘Buyout’ price and surplus benefits for a small biotech firm that produces Glucocerebrosidase 
Enzyme out of transgenic tobacco. Glucocerebrosidase Enzyme is the main treatment for 
Gaucher’s disease. The first section of the paper provides a general description of Gaucher’s 
  3disease and the market for the drug. The model used to determine the ‘Buyout’ price and 
economic surplus benefits is presented in the second section. The therapeutic protein production 
process, unit cost reductions and other data used in the model are presented in the third section 
and the results are provided in the fourth section. The last section discusses the implications of 
the findings for the emerging bio-pharming industry. 
 
Gaucher’s Disease  
Gaucher’s disease is part of some thirty family-genetic (inherited) diseases that are 
identified as lysosomal storage disorders (Rader, 2003). Persons that suffer from the disease lack 
the lysosomal enzyme Glucocerebrosidase. Glucocerebrosidase Enzyme is necessary for 
breaking down lipids and its absence results in a lipid storage disorder. Lipids build up in the 
liver and spleen and result in lung, bone, kidney problems and anemia (Goozner, 2000). 
Gaucher’s disease is very rare, affecting around 20,000 people worldwide
5. There are three types 
of Gaucher’s disease: type I – chronic, non – neuropathic form ; type II – infantile neuropathic ; 
and type III – juvenile neuropathic (Rader, 2003). Type I is the most common of the three and 
1,700 patients with type I Gaucher disease are currently receiving treatment in the US. 
Genetic defects causing Gaucher’s disease were discovered in 1964, and the purified 
Glucocerebrosidase Enzyme was first produced in 1974 (Goozner, 2000). The enzyme was 
purified from human placentas and the process was very expensive. The drug (Ceredase) was 
finally approved from FDA in 1991 and Genzyme patented it. Genzyme continued to produce 
Ceredase from human placentas until 1995 when it licensed a recombinant version of the enzyme 
                                                 
5 This figure includes people that are taking treatment for Gaucher’s disease and people that have not started the 
treatment yet (because the disease is in its very first stages) but are positively diagnosed. 
  4(Cerezyme) produced in Chinese Hampster Ovaries (Goozner, 2000)
6. Cerezyme was found to 
be a more effective treatment than Ceredase because of a slight genetic modification on the 
recombinant enzyme (Rader, 2003). Cerezyme is still the most effective treatment for Gaucher’s 
disease and larger quantities can be produced, because the production of the enzyme does not 
depend on the availability of human placentas. However, production is still very costly.   
Depending on the severity of the disease, patients inject different dosages of Cerezyme 
directly into the blood stream. A patient can take between 0.25 and 3 grams of Cerezyme for a 
one-year period (Rader, 2003).  Persons that suffer from Gaucher disease receive the medicine 
throughout their life. The average cost per patient is $175,000 annually. Almost half of the global 
sales of Cerezyme are in the US, where Genzyme has reached 3,600 out of 5,000-10,000 patients 
with Gaucher’s Disease (Rader, 2003).  
Cerezyme market  
Genzyme is currently the only provider of a treatment for Gaucher’s disease in the US. 
There is another product that is approved in Europe, Zavesca which is produced by Oxford 
Glycosciences plc., but it is used for patients with mild to moderate disease conditions for which 
Cerezyme is unsuitable (Rader, 2003). The Cerezyme patent expired in 2001 but its 
manufacturing method is patented until 2011 and its composition until 2013 (Genzyme Corp., 
2003). The market for Gaucher’s disease treatment has always been a lucrative market, and other 
companies have tried to develop effective treatments but so far with unsuccessful results. 
Vevesca, an alternative Gauscher’s disease treatment by Oxford Glycosciences went through all 
clinical trials and showed promising results but failed to gain approval in the US and Europe 
because 11 percent of the patients developed nervous system complications. Ceredase, the other 
(human-derived) glucocerebrosidase product from Genzyme is being disrupted (patients 
                                                 
6 Recombinant proteins are proteins produced in the cells of genetically modified organisms. 
  5switched to Cerezyme) and sales of Ceredase are very small compared to the sales of Cerezyme 
(Rader, 2003). Thus, Genzyme maintains substantial market power, suggesting it can act as a 
monopolist. The price of Cerezyme has not changed during the last ten years and this might be 
an additional indication of substantial market power. 
 
The Model 
An ex-ante analysis is conducted since Glucocerebrosidase Enzyme from transgenic 
tobacco is not currently in the market. To determine an optimal ‘Buyout’ price we need to know 
the potential marketing strategies of the biotech firm (the innovator) with the bio-pharming 
application and potential profits for each strategy if he/she decides to enter the market. Genzyme 
is assumed to be a perfect monopoly in the current market for Cerezyme because it is the only 
firm (the incumbent) in the market. Although Glucocerebrosidase Enzyme is produced in 
transgenic tobacco, the acreage involved in the production of this particular protein is very small 
(one acre)
7. Further, it is assumed that the transgenic tobacco product is of the same quality as 
Cerezyme. Thus, if the innovator decides to enter, the market becomes a duopoly. The successful 
developer of the patented transgenic production process may follow several potential strategies 
to enter the market. The present study explores the two most common market strategies for 
entrance with an existing monopoly: Cournot and Stackelberg.  
Exact specifications of demand and marginal cost curve are needed in order to calculate 
the profits of the innovator, the change in incumbent’ profits and the economic surplus generated 
from the bio-pharming application under each strategy. The derivations of demand and marginal 
cost curve are discussed below, followed by a detailed description of the Cournot and 
Stackelberg models leading to the optimal ‘Buyout’ price calculation. For simplicity, the 
                                                 
7 The study assumes that transgenic tobacco will be contracted at marginal cost. 
  6Cerezyme market is characterized by linear supply and demand functions derived from 
information on prices, quantities and elasticities of demand and supply.  
Under these assumptions the demand for Cerezyme in price dependent form is 
d Q P λ µ − =     (1)   
where P is the price of one unit of Cerezyme,  is the quantity demanded and µ and λ are the 
intercept and slope terms, respectively. Thus the marginal revenue curve is  
d Q
d Q MR λ µ 2 − =   (2) 
Similarly, a linear marginal cost curve of Cerezyme (in price dependent form) can be specified as  
S Q P η ψ + =    (3)  
 where   is the quantity of Cerezyme produced and  S Q ψ  and η are the intercept and slope terms 
respectively. 
Several studies including Alston, Norton and Pardey (1995) have examined the errors due 
to assumptions about elasticities and functional forms of supply and demand equations when 
modeling the size and distribution of research benefits. Generally, functional forms and 
elasticities are relatively unimportant in determining the size of total benefits compared with the 
nature of the supply shift, while functional forms are relatively unimportant compared with the 
sizes of elasticities and the nature of supply shift in determining the distribution of benefits
8. In 
the absence of information on the specific nature of the supply shift, a parallel shift is usually 
employed, with a pivotal shift providing a distinct contrast in sensitivity analysis. 
In this case the parallel outward marginal cost curve shift is represented as 
                                                 
8 Concerns have also been expressed about inelastic linear supply functions, which when extrapolated back to the 
origin may result in a negative intercept (implying that positive quantities will be supplied at negative prices) 
(Alston, Norton and Pardey, 1995). Rose (1980) suggests that kinking the supply curve can avert the negative 
intercept. Further, the economic surplus calculations after kinking the supply curve at the original quantity are the 
same as the surplus calculations without the kink, demonstrating that the use of an inelastic supply curve does not 
alter the results (Alston, Norton and Pardey, 1995). 
  7()S Q k P η ψ + − =   (4)  
Where k is the size of the unit cost reduction expressed as cost savings for each gram of 
Glucocerebrosidase Enzyme produced from transgenic tobacco compared to CHO.  
For comparison a pivotal supply shift for the same unit is also employed and is represented as 
















0 are equilibrium price and quantity if the incumbent 
behaves as a perfect competitor. 
Being a perfect monopoly, the company charges a price mark-up above the marginal cost 





   (6) 
The price markup depends on the price elasticity of demand (PED) and the marginal cost curve 
of the monopolist. The point where the MC curve and the MR curve meet is derived from (6) and 
it is used to obtain the slope and intercept of the marginal cost curves in (4) and (5).  
Cournot model 
Under the Cournot model both incumbent and entrant choose the quantities produced based on 
the quantity of the other firm. In equilibrium, both firms maximize profits based on consistent 
beliefs about each other’s output. Denote the incumbent’s output level as q1, the innovator’s 
output level as q2, and the aggregate output as Q = q1+ q2. Firm 1 has a cost function given by 
c1(q1) and firm 2 has a cost function given by c2(q2). The maximization problem of firm 1 is 
) ( ) ( ) , (   max 1 1 1 2 1 2 1 1 1 q c q q q p q q q − + = Π     (7) 
  8Similarly, the maximization problem of firm 2 is 
) ( ) ( ) , (   max 2 2 2 2 1 2 1 2 2 q c q q q p q q q − + = Π     (8) 
To determine each firm’s choice of output we take the first order conditions with respect to 
output. The optimal choice of output for each firm (q1* for firm 1 and q2* for firm 2) is derived 
solving simultaneously the first order conditions. The unit cost reductions in case of a parallel 
and a pivotal shift are introduced as specified in (4) and (5), respectively. The solutions to the 
simultaneous equations from the first order conditions are 
2 1 1 2
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) ( ) 2 (
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+ + +
− + + −
= q       (9) 
2 1 1 2
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+ + +
− + + −
= q       (10) 
Based on equilibrium quantities, profits for each firm, the equilibrium market price and also the 
change in consumer surplus generated from the entrance of firm 2 can be calculated.  
Stackelberg model 
The Stackelberg model is a model of quantity leadership. This is a two-stage model where one 
firm moves first, and then, the other firm follows after observing the first firm’s output and then 
choosing its own output. Again, the optimal output for the leader depends on consistent beliefs 
on how the follower responds to the output the leader chooses. In the present study the 
incumbent is the follower and the innovating firm is the leader due to its lower marginal cost. To 
solve for equilibrium outputs we start from stage two and maximize firm 1 profit which is  
  9) ( ) ( ) , (   max 1 1 1 2 1 2 1 1 1 q c q q q p q q q − + = Π       (11)  
Equation (11) is similar to the Cournot condition derived above. Moving from the second stage 
to the first, firm 2 now wants to choose its optimal level of output based on how firm 1 will 
respond. The profit maximization of firm 2 in this case is 
) ( ) ) ( ( ) , (   max 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 1 2 2 q c q q q f p q q q − + = Π       (12) 
Getting the first order conditions of (11) and (12) we can find the optimal output of firm 2 and 
firm 1 given as 
2 1 2 1
2 1 2 1
2 ) 2 2 2 (
) ( ) 2 (
*
η η η η λ λ
ψ µ η ψ ψ µ λ
+ + +
− + − +












q       (14) 
Profits for each firm and changes in consumer surplus are calculated based on the optimal 
quantities of firm 1 and firm 2.   
The ‘Buyout’ Price 
If the market is served by only one firm, as it is the case in the present study, a buyout 
allows the incumbent to retain his/her monopoly position in the market and obtain a patent on a 
more efficient manufacturing method. The buyout may be desirable for the innovator as well in 
instances where the biotech firm is small and lacks the necessary financial and human resources 
to efficiently bring the product in the market.  
  10Both firms are assumed to know the outcomes if they pursue Cournot and Stackelberg 
strategies. These outcomes are considered by the incumbent in computing the ‘Buyout’ price 
offer, and by the innovator in his/her decision on whether to accept or reject the offer. The 
incumbent knows that if the innovator rejects the buyout price, he/she enters the market as a 
Cournot or Stackelberg competitor. Moreover, based on current patents it is assumed that the 
incumbent’s current manufacturing method is patent protected for six more years and after that 
period he/she may face generic competition in the market. As soon as generic competition is 
present, both incumbent’s and innovator’s profits are affected, with the incumbent’s profits 
driven to zero because the generics are produced using the incumbent’s production method
9. But, 
the innovator still retains a cost advantage in his/her production method for the remaining life of 
his/her patent. Thus, we also calculate the expected profits of the innovator over remaining life 
of the patent after he/she faces generic competition in the market. To simplify the analysis, it is 
assumed that the innovator can drive out the competition in the market through limit pricing. 
Assuming that there will be a large number of potential generic entrants in the market (with no 
market power) the innovator will price the product slightly lower than these generic firms’ 
marginal cost, but higher than the innovator’s marginal cost. At the limit price, the innovator 
faces an elastic demand because it gains the whole market with a small price decrease. 
During the limit price period, the expected present value (PV) at time 0 of the corresponding 













    (15) 
Where  denotes the expected PV of potential annual profits of the innovator from the time 
generics may enter the market until innovator’s patent expires (from the beginning of the 7
g Π
th year 
                                                 
9 It is assumed that generics have the same qualities as the original product. 
  11until the end of the 12
th year), k denotes the size of unit cost reduction, 
cQ
0 denotes the quantity 
that would result if the market was competitive with the ‘old’ technology, t denotes each year 
from the time generics may enter the market until the innovator’s patent expires, and r is the 
interest rate
10. 
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Where  denotes the PV of changes in consumer surplus from the time generics may enter 
the market (after incumbent’s patent expires) until the innovator’s patent expires, µ is the 
intercept of the demand curve, 
g CS ∆
cP
0 is the competitive price in the market using the ‘old’ 
technology, 
mP
1 is the monopoly price when the incumbent uses the ‘new’ technology, 
mQ
1 is the 
quantity supplied at that price, and the notation for t and r is the same as in (15). 
Under the assumptions made, it is straightforward to see that the innovator accepts a 
buyout, only if the offer price is at least as high as his/her profit under Cournot and Stackelberg 
plus the expected profits after the potential entry of generic competition. 














        (17) 
where   is the buyout price,   is the potential annual profit of the innovator under Cournot or 
Stackelberg (i = Cournot, Stackelberg), t denotes each year from the time the innovator may 
potentially enter as a Cournot or Stackelberg competitor until the time when generics may enter 
the market, r is the interest rate, and 
B P i Π
g Π  is the same as in equation (15). 
                                                 
10 The interest rate is assumed to be 5 percent. 
  12It is important to note that both firms have the same information regarding the time when 
generics may potentially enter the market. Otherwise, the ‘Buyout’ price that the incumbent 
expects is different from the anticipated ‘Buyout’ price of the innovator. 
If the innovator accepts the offer, the PV at time 0 of nominal changes in incumbent’s profits 
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1 are the resulting monopoly price and quantity if the incumbent uses 




0 are the monopoly price and quantity with the 
incumbent’s technology, t denotes each year from the time of the buyout until his/her ‘old’ patent 
expires (from the beginning of 1st year until the end of 6
th year), and r is the same as before
11.  
In order to calculate the real change in profits for the incumbent we have to add to his/her current 
expected profit, the change in profits in (15) and subtract the ‘Buyout’ price from his/her 
monopoly profits.  
The PV at time 0 of changes in consumer surplus from the buyout time until the time 








} Q ) P ( Q ) P ( 5 . 0 {






      (19) 









1 represent the resulting monopoly price and quantity when the incumbent uses the innovator’s 
technology and they can be calculated for both a pivotal and a parallel shift.  
  13Protein Production Process, Unit Cost Reductions and Other Model Data 
Comparison of the unit cost of Glucocerebrosidase Enzyme from CHO and 
Glucocerebrosidase Enzyme from transgenic tobacco provide a typical example of the relative 
costs of cell culture and transgenic plants as systems for protein production. Production of 
proteins from transgenic plants is similar to the production of proteins from bioreactors using cell 
cultures. The later is a well-established method of protein production in the 
biotechnology/pharmaceutical industry. The process of protein production from cells consists of 
two parts, upstream and downstream processing. During upstream processing the proteins are 
produced in genetically engineered cells that express the desired proteins. Downstream 
processing isolates and purifies the proteins.  
Upstream cell culture processing methods use bioreactors and suspension cells. 
Bioreactors are large containers made of stainless steel, glass or plastic and suspension cells are 
grown in them (Wallman, 1997). These cells are genetically engineered to express the human 
proteins and they produce numerous copies of themselves in bioreactors. When the cells in 
bioreactors reproduce enough copies and reach maturity, they are removed from the bioreactors 
and they undergo centrifugation and/or filtration to separate the cells from the media (Wallman, 
1997). Centrifugation and filtration can be considered as parts of upstream processing. So far, 
bacterial, animal and fungal cells are grown in bioreactors.  
Transgenic plants aim to replace the upstream process by containing the desired proteins 
in their cells. The economic advantage that transgenic plants can offer is that the expression of 
proteins in their cells requires less capital than building bioreactors for cell cultures and also the 
supply can be very flexible. In some cases, the demand for proteins coming from bioreactors can 
not fulfill the demand in the market. Such is the case of Enbrel
R a biotech drug manufactured by 
  14Immunex. The drug was produced in bioreactors but the company did not have enough 
production capacity in its facilities to meet the market demand in 2002 (Biotech.org, 2004). 
Increasing production capacity requires a considerable amount of investment (more than $50 
million for a bioreactor plant) and time (at least 5 years). Using transgenic plants for protein 
production on the other hand is less expensive and production capacity can be extended by 
simply planting more acres.    
Downstream processing includes further filtration and purification using 
chromatography. As Millan et al. (2003) note, traditional purification of pharmaceuticals using 
chromatography accounts for 30% of the production costs (Millan et al., 2003). In general, the 
downstream process of purifying proteins from bioreactors and cell cultures and purifying 
proteins from transgenic plants are basically the same. However, minor differences occur as a 
result of the storage place of protein in the cell and also the actual form of the protein. 
Transgenic plant systems production costs are greatly influenced by expression levels and 
protein recovery
12. Glucocerebrosidase Enzyme was successfully produced in transgenic tobacco 
by CropTech (Blacksburg, VA) and it was enzymatically active (Cramer et al., 1999). CropTech, 
however did not manage to continue research and enter clinical trials because it went out of 
business in 2003, after facing financial difficulties. Crop Tech’s estimates indicated that 1 mg of 
crude Glucocerebrosidase Enzyme can be produced from 1 g of fresh weight of tobacco leaf 
tissue (Cramer et al, 1999). Assuming a 40 percent recovery in order to achieve a pure product, 
and 40 metric tons of tobacco per acre (based on multiple cuttings), less than one acre of 
transgenic tobacco will be sufficient to produce the amount of the Glucocerebrosidase Enzyme 
that Genzyme is producing. 
                                                 
12 Expression level refers to the amount of desired protein in a cell. Protein recovery refers to the amount of the 
desired protein in pure form obtained at the end of purification compared to the initial amount of the protein in the 
cell (as there are significant losses during the purification process). 
  15Unit Cost Reductions 
Economic analysis on the production of therapeutic proteins from transgenic plants has 
been limited to date, largely because there is no drug of transgenic plant origin currently in the 
market. Consequently, there is no commercial size processing of transgenic plants to generate 
accurate data on the economic benefits of bio-pharming. Nevertheless, scientific techniques have 
been used to estimate production costs of proteins from transgenic plants. Kusnadi, Howard, and 
Nikolov (1997) followed by Evangelista et al. (1998) were the first to calculate large scale 
production costs of proteins from transgenic plants compared to cell culture systems. Other 
studies followed, with Misson and Curling (2000) examining the major steps in the production 
system that have the most significant impact on differential production costs. The results lead to 
some important conclusions. First, the cost savings with transgenic plant systems are realized 
during the upstream process, while costs during the downstream process are similar because the 
same techniques are used. Second, the unit cost reduction in the upstream process is primarily 
due to capital cost savings. In transgenic plants, capital costs can be more than 95 percent lower 
than those in cell culture systems. Capital costs for cell culture systems can constitute 20 to 30 
percent or more of protein production costs, but they depend on the size of the operation. For 
outputs of more than 10 tons of protein per year for example, production costs from transgenic 
plants compared to cell culture systems can be up to 10 times cheaper. Based on these factors, 
for output levels of 50 kg/year unit cost reductions can range from 25 to 28 percent (Glacken, 
2000) and 20 to 40 percent (Watler, 2002). 
Since annual production of Glucocerebrosidase Enzyme is 6 kg per year, and the plant-
derived product is not produced commercially, there is some uncertainty about the exact unit cost 
reduction. But, being under the 50 kg/year range, the unit cost reductions simulated in this study 
  16are assumed to range from a minimum of 10 percent up to a maximum of 40 percent with a most 
likely value of 25 percent of the original production cost.  
Market Data 
Estimates of the elasticity of supply of Cerezyme or similar products could not be found 
in the literature. Nevertheless, considering that Genzyme is currently the only provider of a 
treatment for Gaucher’s disease, information on prices and quantities for a period of time may 
help to shed some light on the nature of the supply curve. Cerezyme prices, quantities, and 
changes in price and quantity for the last five years are shown in table 3 below. The initial price 
(
mP
0) of Cerezyme in the analysis was considered $740 per 200 unit vial since the price has not 
changed for the last decade. The initial quantity (
mQ
0) was considered to be equal to the quantity 
for the year 2003. Because the quantity has been constantly increasing, taking an average for 
recent years would likely underestimate the ex-ante benefits of the transgenic product
13.  







(number of 200 










1999 479  647,297  -  740  0 
2000 537  725,676  12  740  0 
2001 570  770,270  6  740  0 
2002 620  837,838  9  740  0 
2003 734  991,892  18  740  0 
Note: Prices represent the direct prices charged from the company for the 200 unit vial and sales of Cerezyme are the revenues of 
Genzyme for each year from charging the direct price. 
 
The upward trend in the quantity of Cerezyme produced also suggests that Genzyme has the 
necessary production capacity to meet demand. Further, the direct price that Genzyme charges 
                                                 
13 Our analysis on the 12 year period may still underestimate the ‘Buyout’ price because we are assuming constant 
number of cases of Gaucher’s Disease. 
 
  17for Cerezyme has not changed for a period of ten years, from 1994 to 2004. The flexibility of 
supply and excess capacity suggests that the supply of Cerezyme is elastic and for the purpose of 
the study, the elasticity of supply is considered to be in the range of 1.5 to 2.5, with a most likely 
value of 2.0. 
  Demand on the other hand seems to be inelastic since a very limited number of people are 
carriers of the Gaucher’s disease and only a few persons are diagnosed each year. Regular 
Cerezyme treatment for patients that are already diagnosed can successfully control and reverse 
severe conditions from the disease (spleen and liver enlargement, bone disease, anemia). 
However, microeconomic theory suggests that a monopolist maximizing his/her profits will 
never operate in the inelastic portion of the demand curve. Consequently, elasticities of total 
demand between -1.001 and -1.5 are considered in the analysis, with -1.25 considered the most 




Changes in incumbent’s profits (∆Π), changes in innovator’s profits and the change in 
consumer surplus under Cournot and Stackelberg are reported in table 4 assuming a minimum 
(10 percent), most likely (25 percent) and maximum (40 percent) unit cost reduction and most 
likely values of elasticity of demand (-1.25) and supply (2.0). For consistency, all the results are 
presented as present values for a period of 12 years for both parallel and pivotal marginal cost 
shifts.  The estimated ‘Buyout’ price along with the changes in incumbent’s profits (∆Π), and 
consumer surplus changes for each unit cost reduction are reported in table 5.  
The primary purpose of including the Cournot and Stackelberg models is to calculate a 
‘Buyout’ price for the innovator. In fact, changes in innovator’s profits under the duopoly models 
  18in table 4 are the same as the ‘Buyout’ price reported in table 5. But the results are interesting on 
their own, as potential market conditions if the innovator decides to enter the market and 
compete. Under this scenario consumers gain the most from the innovation regardless of the 
strategy of imperfect competition. A 25 percent unit cost reduction with a parallel shift generates 
an increase in consumer surplus of $4.2 and $4.8 billion under Cournot and Stackelberg, 
respectively. Changes in consumer surplus are larger under Stackelberg compared to Cournot for 
both types of shifts, and slightly larger under a pivotal shift compared to a parallel shift. Results 
also indicate that innovator’s profits increase and incumbent’s profits decrease as the unit cost 
reduction increases for both a parallel and a pivotal marginal cost shift
14. Due to the first mover’s 
advantage of the innovator under Stackelberg, his/her profits (‘Buyout’ price) are slightly larger 
under Stackelberg compared to the profits under Cournot for both a parallel and a pivotal shift. 
Consequently, incumbent’s profits decrease by more under Stackelberg compared to Cournot. 
For example, a 25 percent unit cost reduction with a parallel shift generates a profit of $1.77 
billion for the innovator under Stackelberg and $1.72 billion under Cournot. Incumbent’s profits 
decrease by $2.1 billion and $1.64 billion under Stackelberg and Cournot, respectively. A pivotal 
shift results in slightly larger profits for the innovator and slightly larger decreases in 





                                                 
14 The incumbent still makes profits but these profits are less than the profits when he/she was a monopoly in the 
Cerezyme market. Base level of incumbent with no innovator is the monopoly profit of $2.980 billion. 
  19Table 4. Estimated surplus changes from minimum, most likely and maximum expected unit 
cost reduction under Cournot and Stackelberg (PV, in thousand U.S.D) 
Parallel Shift 
Unit cost reduction (%MC)  10 25 40 
Cournot  ∆Π Incumbent  (1,616,664)  (1,638,083)  (1,659,335) 
  ∆Π Innovator (Buyout Price) 1,513,986  1,718,357  1,923,490 
  ∆ CS  4,137,922  4,162,372  4,186,923 
Stackelberg  ∆Π Incumbent  (2,085,977)  (2,110,153)  (2,133,999) 
  ∆Π Innovator (Buyout Price) 1,561,840  1,767,800  1,974,556 
  ∆ CS  4,757,355  4,795,163  4,833,185 
Pivotal Shift 
Cournot  ∆Π Incumbent  (1,617,410)  (1,640,606)  (1,664,431) 
  ∆Π Innovator (Buyout Price) 1,515,601  1,723,946  1,935,078 
  ∆ CS  4,138,770  4,165,265  4,192,856 
Stackelberg  ∆Π Incumbent  (2,093,708)  (2,130,623)  (2,168,600) 
  ∆Π Innovator (Buyout Price) 1,577,164  1,809,959  2,048,682 
  ∆ CS  4,769,364  4,827,759  4,889,713 
Note: Results in parenthesis indicate negative changes in profits. 
 
Since the ‘Buyout’ price in table 5 under Cournot and Stackelberg is the same as the 
innovator’s profits in table 4, the main focus of table 5 is on the changes of incumbent’s profits 
and consumer surplus.  Again, consumers are the main beneficiaries from the innovation, but 
consumers gain significantly less from the buyout compared to the gains generated if the 
innovator enters the market (table 4). For example a 25 unit cost reduction with a parallel shift 
generates $2.94 billion in consumer surplus in the buyout case and $4.16 and $4.80 billion in 
consumer surplus if the innovator enters as a Cournot and Stackelberg competitor, respectively. 
With a buyout, the incumbent keeps his monopoly position in the market and charges the profit 
maximizing price using the innovator’s technology. As a result, incumbent’s profits decrease by 
less with a buyout than in the case when the innovator enters the market and competes (table 4). 
The buyout, with a 25 percent unit cost reduction and a parallel shift now generates reductions of 
only $1.28 and $1.33 billion in incumbent’s profits under Cournot and Stackelberg, respectively.  
 
  20Table 5. Estimated ‘Buyout’ Price from minimum, most likely and maximum expected unit cost 
reduction (PV, in thousand U.S.D). 
Parallel Shift 
Unit cost reduction (%MC)  10 25  40 
    Cournot Stackelberg  Cournot Stackelberg Cournot  Stackelberg 
Buyout  ∆Π Incumbent  (1,338,421) (1,386,274) (1,277,896) (1,327,338) (1,216,276)  (1,267,342) 
   Buyout Price  1,513,986 1,561,840 1,718,357 1,767,800 1,923,490  1,974,556 
   ∆ CS   2,890,855 2,944,534  2,999,141 
Pivotal Shift 
Buyout  ∆Π Incumbent  (1,356,215)  (1,417,778)  (1,322,652)  (1,408,664)  (1,288,306)  (1,401,910) 
   Buyout Price  1,515,601  1,577,164  1,723,946  1,809,959  1,935,078  2,048,682 
   ∆ CS   2,882,764  2,924,950  2,968,920 
Note: Results in parenthesis indicate negative changes in profits. 
 
The ‘Buyout’ price for a parallel shift under Cournot varies between $1.52 and $1.92 billion for 
unit cost reductions of 10 and 40 percent, respectively. With Stackelberg, under a parallel shift 
the ‘Buyout’ price ranges from $1.56 billion to $1.97 billion for unit cost reductions of 10 and 40 
percent, respectively.  
As expected, it is in the incumbent’s interest to offer a buyout since he/she experiences a 
smaller reduction in profits compared to the Cournot or Stackelberg outcome. Incumbent’s 
profits decrease by less under a buyout since the incumbent can still behave as a monopolist and 
also effectively extend the life of patented IPRs. Interestingly, with a buyout option, incumbent’s 
losses now decrease as the unit cost reduction increases. This is because the change in monopoly 
profits increases as the unit cost reduction increases and the change in profits more than offsets 
the losses that would incur in Cournot and Stackelberg duopolies as the unit cost reduction 
increases. Overall, the values of the estimated changes in profits and consumer surplus are very 
similar under both types of marginal cost curve shifts. Thus, the choice between a parallel and a 
pivotal shift does not seem to significantly impact the results of the model under all scenarios. 
Finally, consumers continue to gain the most from the unit cost reductions that the innovator’s 
technology brings to the market but these gains are less than under the duopoly scenarios. 
  21Summary and Conclusion 
This study analyzes the potential distribution of economic gains from a buyout, which is 
the most common market strategy of small biotech firms with innovations protected by IPR laws. 
The economics of a buyout strategy are explored for the specific case of a small biotech firm 
successfully adopting bio-pharming methods to produce Glucocerebrosidase Enzyme from 
transgenic tobacco. Results confirm economic benefits to both innovating and incumbent firms 
from consolidation rather than competing. However, consumers lose from consolidation of 
market power through a buyout. Results suggest that the optimal ‘Buyout’ price will be about 
$1.75 billion, indicating that potential profits are very large and capable of spurring significant 
innovations in bio-pharming for therapeutic protein production. Unfortunately, despite large 
profits and consumer gains, the innovation is unlikely to impact tobacco farmers since one acre 
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